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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
ING USA ANNUITY AND LIFE )( 
INSURANCE COMPANY and ING )( 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC, )( 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC. and 
DAMIAN BERRY, 
Defendants. 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
)( 
Civil Action No. 2007CV134590 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
CERTAIN OPINIONS AND FINDINGS OF JOHN FINNERTY 
AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN PORTIONS OF THE 
"SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT" OF JOHN FINNERTY 
On June 24,2010, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral 
argument on Defendants' motions to exclude certain opinions and findings of 
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Finnerty. After reviewing the briefs submitted on the 
motions, Dr. Finnerty's Report and Supplemental Report, the record in the case, 
and the arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
Defendant J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. ("JPMSI") provided investment 
banking services to an Australian mining company named Sons of Gwalia 
Limited ("Gwalia"). Defendant Damian Berry ("Berry") was an employee of 
JPMSI between 1998 and 2002 and was JPMSI's relationship manager for 
Gwalia during that time. Starting in 2000, Gwalia decided to raise capital through 
the private placement of debt securities. This private placement strategy 
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occurred over the course of two offerings-the first in the fall of 2000 ("2000 
Private Placement") and the second in early 2002 ("2002 Private Placement"). 
Plaintiffs lNG-USA Annuity and Life Insurance ("lNG-USA") and ING Investment 
Management LLC ("lNG-1M") participated in the 2002 Private Placement. ING-
USA, a life insurance company, ultimately purchased $32 million of the notes 
offered by Gwalia in the 2002 Private Placement. JPMSI acted as Gwalia's 
broker for both the 2000 Private Placement and the 2002 Private Placement and, 
among other things, assisted Gwalia in preparing a private placement 
memorandum for each offering. In 2004, Gwalia entered into voluntary 
administration which is the Australian equivalent of bankruptcy. 
Plaintiffs allege that during the 2002 Private Placement, Defendants 
misrepresented and concealed Gwalia's true financial picture. In particular, 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misrepresented and concealed: (1) Gwalia's 
investments in derivatives called Indexed Gold Put Options ("IGPOs"), (2) 
Gwalia's liquidity crisis following an unauthorized trading spree by Gwalia's 
director of finance, and (3) problems with Gwalia's acquisition of another gold 
mining company, Pacific Mining Corporation Limited ("Pac Min"). Based on 
these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the Georgia Securities 
Act of 1973 ("GSA"), common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
violations of the Georgia RICO Act. Defendants have moved to exclude certain 
opinions and findings of Plaintiffs' expert Dr. John Finnerty. 
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly adopted O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1, 
which requires a trial court to apply the federal Daubert rule in assessing the 
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admissibility of expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993). Therefore, federal authority, as well as Georgia law, is 
relevant to the question of admissibility. Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 
271, 279 (2008) (holding that it is "proper to consider and give weight to 
constructions placed on the federal rules by federal courts when applying or 
construing" O.C.G.A. § 24-7-67.1 because the Georgia statute was based upon 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert). Pursuant to both O.C.G.A. § 24-9-
67.1 and Daubert, once a court determines that "scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," an expert may give opinion 
testimony so long as such testimony is reliable and relevant. O.C.G.A. §24-9-
67.1; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-595 (1993). O.C.G.A § 24-9-67.1 defines reliable 
and relevant testimony as testimony that is based upon sufficient facts or data, is 
the product of reliable methods, and is the product of a reliable application of the 
methods to the facts of the case. 
The Daubert standard is liberal and favors admissibility. See, §,Q" KSP 
Investments. Inc. v. U.S., 2008 WL 182260 (N.D. OH 2008) ("As commentators 
have noted, Rule 702 evinces a liberal approach regarding admissibility of expert 
testimony. Under this liberal approach, expert testimony is presumptively 
admissible."); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 530 (2008) 
("[R]ejection of expert testimony is the exception, rather than the rule."). In a 
Daubert inquiry, the trial court acts as a "gatekeeper" in determining whether the 
expert is qualified to testify. See, §,Q" CSX Transp., Inc. v. McDowell, 294 Ga. 
App. 871, 872 (2008). 
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Defendants do not contest Dr. Finnerty's qualifications to serve as an 
expert witness. Rather, they seek to exclude certain opinions and findings of Dr. 
Finnerty as unreliable or the result of an improper methodology. Dr. Finnerty is 
the managing principal of Finnerty Economic Consulting, LLC. Dr. Finnerty is 
also a professor of finance and the former director of the master of science 
program in quantitative finance at Fordham University's Graduate School of 
Business. Dr. Finnerty has published extensively in the fields of corporate 
finance and business valuation, and he has more than twenty years of 
experience as an investment banker. Accordingly, the Court finds that Dr. 
Finnerty possesses proper qualifications to allow him to serve as an expert 
witness in this case. 
In support of their motion to exclude certain findings and opinions by Dr. 
Finnerty, Defendants first argue that Dr. Finnerty's causation opinion is "nothing 
more than a mere conduif' for the views of others. "Not even an expert can give 
an opinion based entirely upon reports which have been prepared by others and 
which are not in evidence .... A testifying expert is not to serve as a conduit for the 
opinions of others." Webb v. Thomas Trucking, Inc., 255 Ga. App. 637, 642 
(2002). The Court finds that it is clear from his report that Dr. Finnerty conducted 
his own analysis when forming his opinions in this case and that he did not rely 
on the opinions of others. It may be that Dr. Finnerty and Gwalia's administrators 
reached some of the same conclusions; however, that does not mean he is . 
simply a conduit for their opinions. 
4 
Second, Defendants argue that Dr. Finnerty's damages calculations for 
Plaintiffs' fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and Georgia RICO claims are the 
result of an unreliable method because he used only a single comparable in 
conducting his analysis which is contrary to common practice. The Court finds 
that this arg ument goes to weig ht rather than admissibility. Defendants challenge 
Dr. Finnerty's explanations and choices. "Whether those explanations will 
withstand rigorous cross-examination, or challenges based on alternative 
assumptions or data choices, is not the issue now before the Court." In re Scrap 
metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 527 (2008) ("a determination that 
proffered expert testimony is reliable does not indicate, in any way, the 
correctness or truthfulness of such an opinion"). 
Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Finnerty's initial report must be excluded 
because it contains analysis and opinions that he admits are inaccurate. 
Defendants explain that Dr. Finnerty derived his opinions based on pro forma 
financial statements he developed. At his deposition, Defendants questioned Dr. 
Finnerty about his failure to account for an off-setting tax benefit in his pro forma 
financial statements. At that time, Dr. Finnerty admitted that an adjustment 
should be made, although he subsequently determined that the adjustment did 
not affect any of his conclusions. In his supplement report, Dr. Finnerty 
accounted for the tax benefit, but concluded that the adjustment was not 
significant enough to change his credit analysis. Despite this, Defendants argue 
that the error was so critical that it calls all of Dr. Finnerty's damages calculations 
into question. The Court does not find anything unreliable about Dr. Finnerty's 
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method and further finds that the issue over Dr. Finnerty's correction of his initial 
report goes to weight rather than admissibility. 
Fourth, Defendants argue that through his initial and supplemental reports, 
Dr. Finnerty invades the province of the jury by offering opinions which are 
nothing more than factual testimony. Whether testimony invades the province of 
the jury is a trial objection. It was not made clear to the Court whether Dr. 
Finnerty will testify in person at the trial of this case or by deposition, and thus the 
Court will defer ruling on this issue until the pretrial conference in this case. The 
Court finds that this argument does not go to whether Dr. Finnerty is qualified to 
testify as an expert witness. 
In support of their motion to exclude certain portions of Dr. Finnerty's 
supplemental report, Defendants argue that Dr. Finnerty's supplemental report is 
untimely and unduly prejudicial. In response, Plaintiffs explain that Dr. Finnerty's 
initial report contained a mathematical error because his calculation reversed the 
order of two parts of the statutory formula for the rescission remedy provided in 
the Georgia Securities Act of 1973. In February 2010, Plaintiffs received 
payments from Gwalia's administrators that needed to be accounted for when 
calculating Plaintiffs' damages in this case. When taking steps to account for 
this payment, Plaintiffs' counsel noticed the error in Dr. Finnerty's original 
calculation. As a result, Dr. Finnerty issued a supplemental report·to account for 
the administrators' payment and to correct the mathematical error in his original 
report. The Court finds that the calculation to be used by Dr. Finnerty is a matter 
of law prescribed by the Georgia Securities Act and that a mistake in making that 
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calculation does not vitiate Dr. Finnerty's entire opinion on that subject. The 
Court also finds that the error corrected by Dr. Finnerty's supplemental report 
came to light early enough in litigation so as not to unduly prejudice Defendants 
especially in light of several offers made by Plaintiffs to Defendants in what 
appears to the Court to be a good faith effort to mitigate any possible prejudice 
caused to Defendants because of the mathematical error contained in Dr. 
Finnerty's original report. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Exclude Certain 
Opinions and Findings of John Finnerty and Defendants' Motion to Exclude 
Certain Portions of the "Supplemental Reporf' of John Finnerty are DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 11th day of August, 2010. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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